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Abstract 
Extant research on developed markets shows that investor sentiment is a prominent 
feature in IPO grey markets.  There is sparse work in the context of emerging markets. 
We fill this lacuna by studying the working of the Indian IPO market.  We consider this 
work interesting and relevant for the following reasons.  First, grey market trading always 
involves short-selling as securities are not yet available.  Since legal and institutional 
environment is less developed in emerging markets, the functioning of grey markets is of 
interest to policy makers and financial economists.  Second, retail investors participate to 
a greater extent in IPOs of emerging markets, ostensibly due to the relative paucity of 
institutional investors.  Since prior research has shown that retail investors are more 
prone to overreaction, it is useful to examine if grey market prices proxy for investor 
sentiment.  Finally, if grey markets are associated with price distortion in initial trading 
prices, then investors can potentially exploit this by using trading strategies.  Our 
empirical results show that grey market prices are predictable and that these prices are 
associated with initial listing returns.  Furthermore, selling at grey market prices and 
subsequent short-covering is shown to be profitable.       
 
JEL Classification: G12, G14, and G32 
Key words:  Grey Market, Initial Public Offerings, Investor Sentiment  
 1 
1.0 Introduction  
 
An investor in an IPO in emerging markets such as China, India, Malaysia, and Brazil 
would have earned huge returns on the listing day (China 165%, India 93%, Malaysia 
70%, Korea 55%, Brazil 49%)
1
.  The comparable listing day returns for developed 
countries is much lower (Germany 27%, Australia 20%, U.S. & U.K. about 17%, France 
11%, Canada 7%).  This raises the important issue as to what causes these huge 
differences in initial returns.  A very rich literature based on developed markets has 
sought to justify underpricing using theories based on rationality such as information 
asymmetry.  Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist (1994) based on their study of 25 markets 
provide the following three reasons to explain massive underpricing in emerging markets.  
Average initial returns tend to be higher (i) the greater is the level of government 
interference, (ii) the earlier in the offer process a fixing offering price is set, and (iii) the 
riskier are the firms going public.  As countries have progressed in developing their 
capital markets, the validity of the first two reasons for the massive underpricing has 
vanished.
2
  But emerging markets continue to experience very high initial returns even 
now.  This fact flies in the face of theories grounded in investor rationality such as 
certification or information asymmetry.
3
   
A major difference between the developed and emerging markets with respect to 
initial public offerings is the participation of retail investors.  While institutional investors 
dominate IPO subscriptions in developed markets, retail investors dominate in emerging 
markets.  Extant research is also of the view that retail investors are much more prone to 
                                                 
1
 Source from Jay Ritter’s website: http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/IntJuly2009.pdf 
2
 For instance, the use of book-building is now widely prevalent in both Indian and Chinese markets.  See 
for instance Khurshed, Pande and Singh (2009) and Gao (2009).  
3
 To explain the continued high initial returns on the basis of risk will require more than a heroic effort by 
financial economists.  
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sentiment than institutional investors.  Thus a possible explanation for the high initial 
listing returns in emerging markets is the apparent “irrationality” of the sentiment-driven 
retail investors.  We pursue this line of enquiry in the Indian IPO market.  We are 
encouraged by three major features of the Indian IPO market that make this pursuit 
fruitful.  First, retail investors dominate institutional investors by a factor of two to one.  
Second, pricing of IPOs is no longer controlled by governmental agencies with book-
building as the preferred mechanism for pre-offer price discovery.  Third, there exists an 
active grey market for trading Indian IPOs prior to their listing on the stock market.  The 
grey market is not legally sanctioned, but continues to function and provide liquidity and 
price discovery services for new issues.  The absence of a legal status precludes 
widespread institutional participation and is therefore a relatively cleaner setting for 
examining the role of sentiment-driven trading by retail investors in the new issues 
market.  
 We contribute to the literature in the following ways.  First, our study examines 
the functioning of grey markets is the Indian IPO market. As such, this study breaks fresh 
ground, since we are not aware of any study in an emerging market context. Second, 
since prior research has shown that retail investors are more prone to overreaction, it is 
useful to examine if investor sentiment as proxied by grey market prices can explain 
listing returns. Finally, if grey markets are associated with predictable pattern in 
aftermarket stock prices, then investors can potentially earn abnormal profits by using 
trading strategies.  Our empirical results indicate that grey market prices are predictable 
and that these prices are strongly positively associated with initial listing returns.  
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Furthermore, selling at grey market prices and subsequent short-covering produces 
abnormal profits for retail investors.       
2.0 Institutional Setting 
 
2.1 Indian IPO Market  
 
The oldest stock exchange in India is the Bombay Stock Exchange which was established 
in 1875 and lists 4,887 companies as of March 2008.  The major competitor to the BSE is 
the National Stock Exchange (NSE) which lists 1381 companies as of March 2008.  
There are a number of regional stock exchanges as well. But these are practically defunct.  
Historically, the Indian economy had been regulated with a heavy hand.  This 
changed significantly in 1991 when the Indian government deregulated some segments of 
the economy in response to a serious balance-of-payments crisis.  This was followed by 
deregulation of the capital markets in 1992.  Until 1992, all aspects of capital issuance 
including the pricing of IPOs was controlled by a government agency called the 
Controller of Capital Issues (CCI).  With deregulation, CCI was abolished and market 
forces were allowed to play a greater role in the capital issuance process.  The 
government created the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) to oversee 
regulations in the area of capital markets akin to the role of SEC in the US.  A series of 
reforms was carried out in the primary and secondary markets.  As a result, the amount of 
equity capital raised in Indian capital markets increased from INR 12 billion in 1990 to 
about INR 8543 billion as of 2008.   
The Disclosure and Investor Protection (DIP) Guidelines issued by SEBI 
constitute the basis for regulations governing primary market issuance in India.  A major 
feature of this regulation was the abolition of pricing control that occurred in 1992.  
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Companies with a track record were allowed free pricing of issues while new firms (with 
less than 12 months of operating history) were restricted to issuing equity at par value.  
Initially, IPOs in India were offered only via a fixed price mechanism.  The regulators 
sanctioned the use of book-building for IPOs in September 1999.   
While the regulatory changes have brought the issuance process similar to that of 
developed markets, there remain significant differences between the Indian system and 
those prevailing in the US and Europe.  In order to understand the differences more 
clearly, we describe the IPO issuance process as it obtains now in the following 
subsection.  
 
2.2 The Issuance Process  
 
The first task of the firm conducting an IPO is to select its investment banker.  In Indian 
parlance, the main investment banker is called as the Book Running Lead Manager 
(bookrunner).  The bookrunner initially files a Draft Red Herring Prospectus (DRHP) 
with the regulator.  This document contains all relevant information pertaining to the 
issue except the price.  The bookrunner arrives at a tentative price based on the prospects 
of the issuing firm and market conditions.  A report containing details of the issue 
including price is then circulated amongst its institutional client base and the bookrunner 
conducts the road show.  Based on information collected at the road show, the 
bookrunner arrives at a price band which is similar to the filing range in US parlance.  
The bookrunner then files the Red Herring Prospectus (RHP), which contains the pricing 
band, with SEBI.  The price band is the basis of the book building process.  
The price band provides a minimum and maximum price – the range within which 
the final offer price will lie.  The pricing band could be adjusted upward or downward 
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based on demand.  By regulation, the maximum price in the band cannot exceed 120% of 
the minimum price of the band.  In the US difference between the minimum and 
maximum price in filing price range is almost always USD 2.  Whereas in the US the 
filing range may be revised many times, in India the price band is almost never revised 
upwards and sometimes revised downwards in the face of low demand.   
After filing the RHP, the bookrunner forms a syndicate of brokers/banks/financial 
service providers to perform the book building exercise.  Regulators have categorized 
investors into three classes for the purpose of IPO allocation – Qualified Institutional 
Buyers (QIBs), Non-institutional Investors (NIIs) and retail investors.  The QIBs are to be 
allocated no more than 50% of the offered shares.  Each retail investor is allowed to 
invest a maximum of INR 100,000 and collected retail investors should be allocated a 
minimum of 35% of the offered shares.  NIIs are essentially retail investors who invest 
more than INR 100,000 in an issue and are collectively allocated 15% of the shares.  
Thus in every issue retail investors are guaranteed a minimum of 50% of the shares 
offered.     
The book building period typically lasts for 5 days with a minimum of 3 days and 
a maximum of 10 days as ordained by the regulator.  All classes of investors have to 
place their bids only through the syndicate.  All bids may be modified during the book 
building period.  The bids are electronically entered by the syndicate members and 
transmitted to the Bombay and National Stock Exchanges through a satellite network.  
The books are updated and disseminated at half-hourly intervals by BSE and NSE.  The 
websites show for each category of investors, the number of shares applied for and the 
percentage of the issue that has been subscribed.   
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After the completion of the book-building period, the bookrunner in consultation 
with the managers of the issuing firm decide on the offer price.  If the issue is 
oversubscribed for any category of investors, then pro-rata allocation is made by means 
of a lottery.  It is the responsibility of the stock exchanges to ensure that the allocation is 
conducted in an impartial manner.    
In addition to the regulations outlined in this section, issuing firms also need to 
get their offer of initial public offerings graded by one of the accredited credit rating 
agencies.  We explain the relevant details of this requirement below.  
 
2.3 IPO Grading  
In March 2007 the Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI), the securities market 
regulator in India, made it imperative for all initial public offerings (IPO) entering the 
capital market to get a grading from one of the credit rating agencies
4
.  The move has the 
objective of preventing fly-by-night operators from accessing the capital market.  
Mandatory IPO grading was to be effective from May 1, 2007.  
IPO grade is the rating assigned by a Credit Rating Agency (CRA) registered with 
SEBI, to the IPO of equity shares or any other security which may be converted into or 
exchanged with equity shares at a later date.  The grade represents a relative assessment 
of the fundamentals of that issue in relation to the other listed equity securities in India.  
Such grading is generally assigned on a five-point point scale with a higher score 
indicating stronger fundamentals and vice versa as below. 
                                                 
4
 There are four credit rating agencies in India: CRISIL, CARE, ICRA and Fitch.  CRISIL is owned by 
Standard and Poor.  Moody’s is the largest shareholder in ICRA.   
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IPO grade 1: Poor fundamentals 
IPO grade 2: Below-average fundamentals 
IPO grade 3: Average fundamentals 
IPO grade 4: Above-average fundamentals 
IPO grade 5: Strong fundamentals 
IPO grading can be done either before filing the draft offer documents with SEBI 
or thereafter.  However, the Prospectus/Red Herring Prospectus, as the case may be, must 
contain the grade/s given to the IPO by all CRAs approached by the company for grading 
such IPO.  Interestingly, IPO grades were not assessed taking into account the price at 
which the IPO was to be issued.  
Under the regulation, companies rather than investor-protection fund would bear 
the costs of the grading process.  The cost of grading each issue is approximately Rs 
500,000 and takes around 3-4 weeks.  Grading of IPOs was introduced earlier as an 
optional measure by SEBI as part of its initiatives aimed at protecting investors’ interests. 
According to CRISIL, one of the top credit rating agencies in India, IPO grading 
represents an independent relative assessment of fundamentals of the equity based on the 
following:  
a. Business Prospects. This comprises  
i. Industry prospects  
ii. Company prospects - the alignment between industry opportunities, the company's strategy and its capabilities. 
b. Financial Prospects - This includes a rigorous assessment of accounting quality using advanced tools devised by 
CRISIL Research  
c. Management quality - An assessment of the ability of the management to handle uncertainty in terms of capitalizing 
on future business opportunity and mitigating the impact of contingencies 
d. Corporate governance - An evaluation of the company's governance architecture to determine if it is structured such 
that the risks and rewards of business are equally available to all shareholders in keeping with the basic tenets of a 
joint-stock company. 
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Typically the grading exercise begins when the firm enlists the services of a CRA.  
Analysts from the CRA hold meetings with the CEO, CFO, and heads of strategic 
business units.  They also visit the firm’s plants if required.  The rationale for grade 
awarded is conveyed to the firm.  This information is required to be disclosed in the 
prospectus.  
 
2.4 Grey Market 
Another interesting feature of the Indian IPO market is the existence of a Grey Market.  
Grey market is an unofficial market where IPO shares are bought and sold before they 
become officially available for trading on the stock exchange.  It is an over-the-counter 
market where dealers may execute orders for preferred customers as well as provide 
support for a new issue before it is actually issued.  Grey market trading include trading 
(selling or buying) applications for a fee and trading (selling or buying)  allocated shares 
of an IPO issue before they list on stock exchanges.  
Grey market trading is not officially sanctioned and is therefore not legal.  
However, there exists an active grey market for IPOs in the Indian cities of Ahmedabad, 
Delhi, Jaipur, Kolkata, Mumbai, and Rajkot.  Trading usually occurs between a set of 
people who trust each other as there is no official platform or clearly defined rules.  
Trades done in the grey market are settled on the day of listing.  The seller must deliver 
the shares sold by her to the buyer.  If the seller is allocated less number of shares than 
what she has sold, she has to buy from the market and deliver.  Most of the issues sell at a 
premium to the offer price.  However, it is not uncommon to see some issues selling at a 
discount to the offer price.   
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A thriving grey market exists because of divergent perceptions regarding a 
particular issue.  While some investors see the issue as highly underpriced and are willing 
to pay a substantial premium, others may feel that the high premium is not justified.  The 
grey market for a given issue becomes active once the firm announces its book building 
dates.  The grey market price is determined in the market based on supply and demand 
and fluctuates over time.  Information regarding grey market prices can be obtained from 
websites dedicated to IPOs such as chittorgarh.com, greymarket.in, and 
smartinvestment.in.  Since grey market trading is illegal, official sources of grey market 
are not available from the stock exchanges or bookrunners.  Grey market remains active 
until the stock is listed.  Since it typically takes about three weeks from the closure of 
book to the commencement of trading on the stock exchange, grey market prices provide 
an early indicator for the expected listing price of the issue.  As such even investment 
bankers pay attention to the grey market price to predict possible listing price.  
3.0 Data and Sample Selection 
Our sample includes all Indian IPOs that were issued from May 1, 2007 to December 31, 
2008.  We obtained our data from five different sources.  SDC Platinum New Issues data 
base was our source for basic issue characteristics.  The website of the regulator was 
utilized as the source of issue prospectuses.
5
  Bloomberg database was our source for 
stock prices and trading volume.  We accessed the websites of the credit rating agencies 
to obtain the IPO grades.  Finally, we collected the grey market premium (GMP) from 
various websites dedicated to IPOs such as chittorgarh.com, greymarket.in, and 
smartinvestment.in.   
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 We used the website of Security and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), http://www.sebi.gov.in/ for IPO 
prospectuses.  
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Our overall sample is composed of 75 issues which went public between May 
2007 and December 2008.  In Table 1, we show descriptive statistics regarding offer, firm 
and corporate governance characteristics of our entire sample and the two subsamples 
based on grey market premium.  We characterize as an issue as one low grey market if 
the GMP on the day before listing was below or equal to the median for the sample.  The 
rest of the sample is classified as issue with high GMP.  
First, we note a number of significant differences between the low and high GMP 
subsamples with regard to offer characteristics.  The average net proceeds of high GMP 
firms is significantly higher than that of low GMP firms.  This finding implies that firms 
making larger issues enjoy higher grey market premiums.  The offer price is also higher 
for high GMP firms as compared to low GMP firms.  High GMP firms also enjoy higher 
listing returns on the opening day of trading.  High GMP firms on average use more 
reputed underwriters as compared to low GMP firms.  Second, we find a few significant 
differences between high and low GMP with respect to firm characteristics.  High GMP 
firms on average have higher EPS as compared to low GMP firms.  Furthermore the Net 
Asset Value per share is higher for high GMP firms as compared to low GMP firms.  
Although low GMP firms have a higher mean value of total assets than low GMP firms, 
the medians show the exact opposite pattern.  A similar pattern is also observed for total 
liabilities.  Thus we can conclude that large size firms which are more profitable and have 
more asset value per share enjoy higher grey market premiums.  Third, there are just a 
few significant differences between high and low GMP firms with respect to corporate 
governance.  High GMP firms tend to have busier managing directors and higher post-
issue holdings of promoters as compared to low GMP firms.  
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4.0  IPO Pricing and Listing Returns in the Presence of a Grey Market 
 
4.1 Related Literature  
There exists a large literature that implies a significant presence of sentiment investors in 
the IPO market.  For instance, Ritter (1991) finds that abnormally high prices at the 
listing of an IPO is followed by abnormally low returns in the long-run.  Ritter and Welch 
(2002) show that this reversal pattern is especially strong in hot market periods.  
Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2003) find that issues which are overpriced relative to 
their fundamental values experience high returns on the listing day but are followed by 
lower returns in the long run.  An explanation for this finding is that underwriters set the 
offer price at a price higher than the fair value when investors exhibit excessive interest in 
a particular issue.  Thus we observe a high return in the short-run and the price drifts 
down towards its fundamental value.  Similar findings are reported by Ljungqvist, Nanda, 
and Singh (2006).   
Using the grey market, some researchers measure the expectations of sentiment 
investors directly.  Dorn (2003) reports that the volume of grey market trading among the 
customers of a German retail brokerage firm is correlated with high listing returns and 
low returns subsequently.  Loffler, Panther, and Thiessen (2005) find that grey market 
prices are unbiased predictors of first-day prices.  Aussenegg, Pichler, and Stomper (2006) 
report similar findings.  Cornelli, Goldreich, and Ljungqvist (2006) using grey market 
data for a large number of European IPOs find an asymmetric relation between grey 
market prices and subsequent returns.  When grey market prices are high subsequent 
returns are lower.  This pattern does not occur when grey market prices are low.  They 
attribute this finding to the enthusiasm of small investors who drive the prices high in the 
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short-run in the aftermarket followed by a reversal as price converges to the fundamental 
value over the long-run.  
In the case of the Indian market which is dominated by retail investors, we are 
likely to find the impact of sentiment investors on IPO returns.  Furthermore, the long 
delay of about three-weeks between the completion of book building and stock market 
listing provides an ample opportunity for sentiment investors to trade based on their 
excessive interest in a given issue.  Furthermore, it also gives sophisticated investors an 
opportunity to exploit sentiment investors to make an abnormal profit.  Thus it is possible 
that our findings reflect the findings reported in studies of other grey markets for IPOs.  
On the other hand, it is possible that sentiment investors’ overreaction could be corrected 
more rapidly in the cases of issues with high grey market prices.  We therefore, examine 
this empirically in the following subsection.  
4.2 Determinants of Grey Market Premium 
 
In this subsection we address the important issue of determinants of grey market premium.  
We measure grey market premium as the ratio of grey market price to offer price.  The 
grey market price is the price over offer price that investors are willing to buy or sell in 
the unofficial market.  We conduct OLS regressions using grey market premium as the 
dependent variable and firm characteristics, issue features and investor demand as 
independent variables.  Our results are reported in Table 2.  The main empirical fact that 
we document is that the level of oversubscription of the issue is a major determinant of 
the grey market premium.  Univariate regression with the overall oversubscription 
variable shows adjusted R
2 
of 65%.  Issues with stronger investor demand apparently 
command higher prices in the grey market.  When we separate the oversubscription in to 
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three categories based on the type of investor: Retail, QIB (institutional) and non-
institutional, we get similar results.  The strongest coefficient is for retail 
oversubscription, while the highest R
2
 is obtained with QIB oversubscription.  Other 
variables such as IPO Grade, Offer Price and Return on Net worth are highly statistically 
significant.  The results indicate that investors price the issue based on the quality 
perception denoted by the grade issued by credit rating agencies.  The results also imply 
that investors regard offer price as a quality proxy.  We don’t have an explanation for the 
negative impact of Return on Net worth on grey market premium.  
 4.3 Impact of Grey Market Prices on Aftermarket Returns and Volume 
 
We report results of regressions of listing returns (Model 1) in Table 3.  The results show 
that listing day returns are strongly positively related to GMP on the day prior to listing.  
This finding indicates that grey market prices provide early indications regarding listing 
day prices.  As such our evidence is consistent with earlier work on grey market such as 
Loffler, Panther, and Theissen (2005) and Aussenegg, Pichler, and Stomper (2006).  IPO 
grades are strongly negatively related to listing returns indicating that IPO grades act as a 
quality signal thereby reducing the underpricing.  Offer price is also negatively related to 
underpricing suggesting that offer price acts as a quality proxy.  The basic results are 
unaltered when we use days 2, 5, 10 and 20 closing prices to measure underpricing.  As 
such, these results indicate that grey market prices possess strong information content 
regarding future stock price after listing.  It appears that investor sentiment is captured in 
grey market prices which is then carried through in after-market prices.  
Another aspect of investor sentiment is the associated trading volume.  If grey 
market prices are indicative of heightened investor interest, then we should expect to see 
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higher trading volume on listing for issues with high grey market premium.  We report 
results using natural logarithm of trading volume as a dependent variable in a multivariate 
framework in Table 5.  Univariate results show that GMP has a negative impact on 
trading volume.  GMP is not significant when we use a set of independent variables such 
as Issue Size, Age etc.  We find similar results when we use turnover as the dependent 
variable.  The results clearly show that grey market activity does not have an impact on 
the trading activity on the listing day.  While these results are surprising, they are not 
inexplicable.  It appears that for issues with high investor interest trading takes place in 
the pre-listing grey market as impatient investors don’t need to wait until stock market 
listing.   
While we have shown that grey market prices have information content and are 
therefore indicative of listing prices, it is not clear if there exists investor overreaction.  In 
order to examine investor overreaction, we examine after-market returns for various 
horizons up to 120 days from the listing day.  The results are shown in Table 4.  In Panel 
A, we show returns based on offer prices.  We add time as a variable to capture the time 
trend in after-market returns.  The main result of Panel A is that GMP is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level for all windows.  Time trend is negative and 
statistically significant consistent with the international evidence that after-market returns 
for IPOs are predominantly negative.  Underwriter reputation and analyst 
recommendation are always positive indicating that these are not priced in the offer price. 
IPO grades have a negative coefficient indicating that underwriters price them higher 
ceteris paribus.  Book built issues have higher after-market returns other things being 
equal.  Issue with higher offer prices and higher issue sizes have lower returns.  Firms 
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with higher return on net worth and those with higher total assets earn higher returns.  
Overall, our results suggest that grey market prices have information content regarding 
future returns of the IPOs.  
In panel B, we examine after-market returns based on the closing price on the 
listing day.  GMP is positive and significant for up to 30 days.  Beyond that period, its 
significance drops.  The key finding is that GMP does not enter with a negative sign. 
Issues with a higher grey market price are not associated with a steeper correction in the 
after-market.  As such our results are at variance with those reported by Cornelli, 
Goldreich, Ljungqvist (2006).   
In order to understand our findings more clearly, we plot the mean and median 
grey market premium and underpricing (measure at the closing price on the listing day) 
and report the outcome in Figures 1 and 2. These figures clearly show that listing prices 
are lower than that implied by grey market prices. That is prices start correcting 
downwards starting from the listing day. We also notice sharper corrections for high 
GMP subsample as compared to the low GMP subsample. We examine further the 
magnitude of price corrections using grey market prices as the benchmark. A graphic 
portrayal of our results is contained in Figures 3 and 4. Starting from the listing day, 
after-market prices correct sharply from the grey market prices. From day 2 to 20, the 
corrections increase almost monotonically. Relative to grey market prices, the median 
correction is about 25% for high GMP firms and about 18% for low GMP firms.  
In order to understand this phenomenon further, we plot average cumulative 
returns from listing day until 120 days.  For the subsample with high GMP there is an 
initial sharp correction followed by a gentle downward adjustment in prices.  On the other 
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hand for low GMP firms, we find that initial correction is less sharp, but subsequently the 
price reversion is much more steeper.  An implication of our finding is that while high 
Grey Market Prices are indicative of a preponderance of sentiment traders, they may also 
indicate the presence of sophisticated investors who stand ready to exploit investor 
irrationality.         
Summing up, we find that after-market returns of Indian IPOs start correcting 
from the prices indicated by grey market prices. As such this pattern is potentially 
exploitable by sophisticated investors. Empirical evidence on this is shown in the next 
section.   
 
5.0 Trading Strategies to Profit from Grey Market Prices 
Can a savvy investor exploit the observed pattern in after-market prices relative to the 
grey market prices? We explore this more fully by utilizing two strategies. Strategy A 
involves selling at the grey market prices and delivering the shares on the listing day.  
When an issue is oversubscribed we assume that an investor gets a fractional allotment 
and buys the rest of the shares short-sold from the market at the closing price on the 
listing day. The results of this strategy are shown only for retail investors.  We also show 
the results of the profits from this strategy by short-covering on days 2, 5, 10 and 20.  
Strategy B involves buying shares at the prices implied by grey market and selling it 
in the aftermarket on listing day and days 2,5,10 and 20.  As such this strategy tries to 
examine if there is a momentum effect and whether investor exploit it to make profits.   
The results of investment strategies A and B are shown in Table 6. Based on both 
raw and excess returns Strategy A shows positive returns for all horizons and for both 
 17 
low and high GMP subsamples. The median raw returns range from 16.3% to 24.8% for 
the high GMP subsample and from 9% to 17.8% for low GMP subsample. High GMP 
stocks on average higher profits from strategy A as compared to low GMP stocks but the 
differences are only weakly significant for some of the horizons. A similar pattern is 
observed when we observe excess returns arising from implementing strategy A.  
 In contrast to strategy A, strategy B does not show positive returns for any 
horizon. We dichotomize the returns for firms with high and low oversubscription. The 
returns from following strategy B are predominantly negative and there no significant 
difference across the subsamples.  Both raw returns and excess returns are preponderantly 
negative for strategy B.   
Summing up, it appears that grey market prices incorporate retail investors’ 
sentiment in Indian IPOs. Interestingly, the effects of this start to get corrected rather 
quickly starting from the listing day. Sophisticated investors are able to profit from 
following a strategy of selling at the grey market price and subsequent short-covering on 
listing.    
6.0 Conclusion  
 
There exist a number of research papers that document a significant role for investor 
sentiment in IPO markets.  Recent work based on grey markets in developed countries 
show that initial high returns for IPOs and their subsequent reversal can be explained by 
investor sentiment. In the context of emerging markets, IPOs are shown to earn very high 
returns which are not easily explained by theories involving investor rationality. A 
plausible explanation is the existence of investor sentiment.  We study the grey market 
for Indian IPOs to examine the role of sentiment investors.   
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Our principal findings are as follows. First, grey market prices are highly 
predictable and they are related to the subscription levels of investors.  Second, initial 
listing returns are positively and significantly related to grey market premium.   Third, 
aftermarket returns start correcting sharply from listing day onwards when we use grey 
market prices as the basis. This gives rise to a profitable trading strategy of selling at grey 
market prices followed by short-covering upon listing.   
 19 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table reports the offer, firm and corporate governance characteristics of Indian IPOs in Panel A, B and C, respectively. The IPO sample period is from May 2007 to 
December 2008.  The low and high grey market premiums (GMP) are classified by the median of GMP.  If the firm’s GMP is equal and lower (higher) than the median 
GMP, the firm is classified by low (high) GMP.   Shares offered is the number of shares issued to the public by the issuers.  Net proceeds is the total amount raised by the 
issuers excluding fees and expenses.  Offer price is the issuing price of the IPO shares.  Low (High) file price is the lowest (highest) offer price.  Offer-to-Open (Offer-to-
Close) return BSE is the difference between the opening (closing) price and offer price as a percentage of the offer price for IPOs listing on Bombay Stock Exchange.  
Total subscription (oversubscription) is the aggregate of QIB, retail and non-institutions subscriptions (oversubscription times).  QIB and retail subscription 
(oversubscription) are the qualified institutional buyers and retail investors subscription (oversubscription times), respectively.  UW reputation is the investment bank’s 
reputation measured by the market shares of the proceeds and overallotment shares raised by them during 2006 – 2008.  The number of underwriters includes lead and 
co-lead manager in the IPO activity.  Age is the number of years from incorporating to listing year for IPO firms.  Sales, net income, cash flows from operating, total 
assets, total liabilities, EPS, return on net worth and net assets value per share are based on the most recent fiscal year ending prior to the IPO.  Number of directors is the 
total number of directors on the board, number of independent directors is the total number of independent or outside directors.  Busy managing director is the number of 
concurrent directorships held by the managing director.  Managing director age is the age of managing director.  Board age is the average age of the board of directors.  
Managing director (Board) shareholding pre-IPO is the percentage of shares held by managing director (board of directors) prior to IPO.  Promote shareholdings pre- and 
post-IPO are the percentage of shares held by the firm’s promoters before and after the IPO, respectively.  The financial and corporate governance data are retrieved from 
the IPO prospectus.  The mean and median comparisons of low and high GMP samples are based on the independent t-test and Wilcoxon Signed Rank test, respectively.  
***
, 
**
, and 
* 
represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for a two-tailed test, respectively. 
 
 All Firms Low GMP High GMP Difference 
 N=75 N=41 N=34 Low GMP – High GMP 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean t-test Median 
Wilcoxon 
Signed-
Rank test 
Panel A Offer Characteristics 
Shares Offered (million) 24.611 5.912 17.873 6.500 32.736 4.900 -14.863 -0.79 1.600 -1.59 
Net Proceeds ($million) 44.142 9.963 14.030 6.111 80.453 17.070 -66.423** -2.09 -10.959*** -3.47 
Offer Price 219.893 150.000 108.585 82.000 354.118 332.500 -245.532*** -6.25 -250.500*** -5.55 
Low File Price 200.800 125.000 101.000 80.000 321.147 305.000 -220.147*** -6.15 -225.000*** -5.53 
High File Price 225.120 150.000 112.171 85.000 361.324 340.000 -249.153*** -6.21 -255.000*** -5.55 
Offer-to-Open Return BSE 0.211 0.099 0.128 0.063 0.312 0.270 -0.184*** -2.95 -0.207** -2.33 
Offer-to-Close Return BSE 0.311 0.150 0.232 0.057 0.408 0.242 -0.176 -1.25 -0.185** -2.19 
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Total Subscription (million) 996.548 55.563 285.121 17.164 1,880.442 190.593 -1,595.320 -1.32 -173.430*** -4.61 
QIB Subscription (million) 794.797 16.774 206.1611 4.313 1526.132 135.529 -1,319.971 -1.28 -131.216*** -6.05 
Retail Subscription (million) 70.075 14.078 43.802 9.416 102.718 20.458 -58.916 -1.19 -11.042** -2.03 
Oversubscription (times) 75.614 19.980 23.426 8.640 140.453 107.953 -117.027*** -4.97 -99.313*** -4.99 
QIB Oversubscription (times) 30.396 6.914 7.714 1.740 58.577 52.105 -50.863*** -5.50 -50.365*** -6.10 
Retail Oversubscription (times) 13.304 5.398 6.853 3.194 21.318 14.010 -14.465*** -2.90 -10.816*** -3.10 
UW Reputation (%) 2.789 0.900 1.672 0.900 4.135 4.280 -2.462*** -3.70 -3.380*** -3.36 
Number of Underwriters 2.040 2.000 1.805 2.000 2.324 2.000 -0.519 -1.57 0.000 -1.56 
Panel B Firm Characteristics 
Age 15.773 13.000 16.122 12.000 15.353 14.500 0.769*** 5.13 -2.500 -1.38 
Sales ($million) 4,216.797 1,287.689 3,975.142 968.420 4,501.096 2,450.905 -525.954 -0.24 -1,482.485*** -2.61 
Net Income ($million) 631.157 133.165 409.277 67.104 892.193 226.356 -482.916 -1.08 -159.252*** -3.83 
Cash Flows from Operating 
($million) 
542.419 16.088 280.606 20.148 858.134 -31.775 -577.529 -0.32 51.923 -1.46 
Total Assets ($million) 25,603.873 1,295.150 33,136.234 845.555 16,520.731 2,774.310 16,615.503 0.63 -1,928.755*** 3.43 
Total Liabilities ($million) 22,451.813 747.564 30,895.055 420.667 12,270.257 1,175.260 18,624.798 0.77 -754.593*** -2.79 
EPS 11.638 9.980 8.550 7.145 15.272 12.890 -6.723*** -2.82 -5.745*** -2.93 
Return on Net Worth 27.187 24.700 23.619 20.000 31.279 26.400 -7.659 -1.56 -6.400 -1.35 
Net Assets Value Per Share 50.180 29.375 34.083 23.175 69.117 47.950 -35.034** -2.20 -24.775*** -2.78 
Panel C Corporate Governance Characteristics 
Number of Board of Directors 7.613 8.000 7.268 7.000 8.029 8.000 -0.761 -1.62 -1.000* -1.67 
Number of Independent Directors 3.840 4.000 3.683 3.000 4.029 4.000 -0.346 -1.49 -1.000* -1.80 
Busy Managing Director 5.440 3.000 2.732 2.000 8.706 6.500 -5.974*** -4.11 -4.500*** -4.28 
Managing Director Age 48.200 47.000 47.683 47.000 48.824 46.500 -1.141 -0.44 0.500 0.28 
Board Age 53.054 53.500 52.508 53.500 53.713 53.465 -1.205 -1.02 0.035 0.62 
Managing Director Shareholdings 
Pre-IPO (%) 
21.314 16.270 22.379 16.270 20.031 15.690 2.348 0.46 0.580 0.07 
Board Shareholdings Pre-IPO (%) 39.486 38.800 39.814 38.650 39.091 41.050 0.722 0.12 -2.400 -0.07 
Promoter Shareholdings Pre-IPO 
(%) 
80.154 84.080 82.560 86.810 77.253 77.980 5.307 1.26 8.830 0.97 
Promoter Shareholdings Post-IPO 
(%) 
58.458 57.750 55.073 52.880 62.540 62.064 -7.467** -2.16 -9.184** -2.01 
 
  
 23 
 
Table 2 Grey Market Premium Regression Results 
 
The dependent variable is the grey market premium (GMP) which is measured by the closing grey 
market premium.  Over Subscription is the number of times of over subscriptions of the qualified 
institutional buyers (QIB), retail bidders and non-institutional bidders.  QIB Over Subscription is the 
number of times of over subscription of the qualified institutional buyers, i.e. mutual funds.  Retail Over 
Subscription is the number of times of over subscription of the retail bidders including Hindu undivided 
family, non-resident Indians, etc.  Non-Institutional Over Subscription is the number of times of over 
subscription of the non-institutional bidders other than QIB and retail bidders.  Grading is the actual 
grade assigned by the grading agencies and ranges from 1 to 5; for non-graded IPOs, we assigned the 
value of zero.  VC takes the value of 1 if the IPO is backed by venture capital; zero otherwise.  UW 
Reputation is the investment bank’s reputation measured by the market share of the proceeds and 
overallotment shares raised during 2006 – 2008.  Group Affiliation is a dummy variable which equals 1 
if the IPO is group affiliated; zero otherwise.  Analyst Recommend is the dummy variable which equals 
1 if the IPO is recommended for subscription; (avoid) zero otherwise.  Method is the dummy variable 
which equals 1 if IPO method is fixed-price; zero otherwise.  Offer Price is the logarithm of IPO offer 
price.  Issue Size is the logarithm of number of shares offered.  MKT(t-1) is the market returns measured 
by the Sensex index monthly returns prior to the IPO month.  RONW is the return on net worth prior to 
the IPO as reported in the prospectus.  Chg_Promoter Shares is the ratio of post-IPO promoter shares 
and pre-IPO promoter shares.  Total Assets is prior to the IPO and is collected from prospectus.  Age is 
the logarithm of number of years from incorporated year to IPO year.  
*
, 
**
, and 
***
 represent the 10%, 
5%, and 1% two-tailed significance level, respectively. The t-statistics in the parentheses are White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept -3.095 0.065 0.366*** 0.235** 0.598 
 (-1.24) (1.04) (3.04) (2.58) (0.51) 
Over Subscription     0.009*** 
     (8.25) 
QIB Over Subscription  0.026***    
  (6.56)    
Retail Over Subscription   0.036***   
   (4.74)   
Non-Institutional Over Subscription    0.019***  
    (4.67)  
Grading 0.103    0.189*** 
 (1.23)    (3.21) 
VC -0.314    -0.570* 
 (-0.58)    (-1.81) 
Underwriter Reputation -0.050    0.027 
 (-0.86)    (0.98) 
Group Affiliation -0.412    0.054 
 (-1.56)    (0.46) 
Analyst Recommendation 0.502*    0.051 
 (1.74)    (0.33) 
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Method 0.210    0.276 
 (0.61)    (1.48) 
Offer Price 0.820***    0.542*** 
 (3.51)    (4.61) 
Issue Size 0.020    -0.105 
 (0.13)    (-1.56) 
MKT(t-1)     -2.400 
     (-0.83) 
RONW -1.921**    -1.058*** 
 (-2.54)    (-3.20) 
Chg Promoter Shareholdings 0.479    -1.108 
 (0.39)    (-1.19) 
Total Assets -0.031    -0.031 
 (-0.34)    (-0.75) 
Age -0.043    -0.172 
 (-0.18)    (-0.99) 
Adj. R
2
 0.293 0.673 0.285 0.545 0.787 
F-statistic 3.49*** 151.42*** 30.04*** 88.45*** 19.71*** 
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Table 3 Underpricing Regression Results 
 
The dependent variable is underpricing.  We measured the underpricing as the offer-to-close return, [(closing price – offer price) / offer price], on the listing 
day, 2-day, 5-day, 10-day and 20-day in Model 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, respectively.  GMP Residual is the adjusted grey market premium measured by regressing grey 
market premium on the quality variables, i.e. Grading, VC, UW Reputation, Group Affiliation, Analyst Recommend, Offer Price, Issue Size, RONW, 
Chg_Promoter, Total Assets and Age.  Grading is the actual grade assigned by the grading agencies and ranges from 1 to 5; for non-graded IPOs we assigned 
the value of 0.  VC takes the value of 1 if the IPO is backed by venture capital; zero otherwise.  UW Reputation is the investment bank’s reputation measured by 
the market share of the proceeds and overallotment shares raised during 2006 – 2008.  Group Affiliation is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the IPO is group 
affiliated; zero otherwise.  Analyst Recommend is the dummy variable which equals 1 if the IPO is recommended for subscription; (avoid) zero otherwise.  
Method is the dummy variable which equals 1 if IPO method is fixed-price; zero otherwise.  Offer Price is the logarithm of IPO offer price.  Issue Size is the 
logarithm of number of shares offered.  RONW is the return on net worth prior to the IPO as reported in the prospectus.  Chg_Promoter Shares is the ratio of 
post-IPO promoter shares and pre-IPO promoter shares.  Total Assets is prior to the IPO and is collected from prospectus.  Age is the logarithm of number of 
years from incorporated year to IPO year.  
*
, 
**
, and 
***
 represent the 10%, 5%, and 1% two-tailed significance level, respectively. The t-statistics in the 
parentheses are White heteroskedasticity-consistent. 
 
 
Model 1 
  
Model 2 
  
Model 3 
  Intercept 2.882** 1.859* 3.450*** 3.322** 1.797 3.567** 3.249** 1.394 3.584** 
 
(2.27) (1.68) (2.63) (2.34) (1.48) (2.34) (2.17) (1.02) (2.11) 
GMP Residual 0.213** 0.126*** 0.130** 0.128 0.112* 0.089 0.085 0.063 0.032 
 
(2.52) (2.66) (2.10) (1.27) (1.93) (1.16) (0.81) (1.00) (0.45) 
GRADING -0.094*** -0.074** -0.083*** -0.107*** -0.092*** -0.099*** -0.112*** -0.094** -0.102*** 
 
(-2.84) (-2.37) (-2.65) (-2.87) (-2.58) (-2.63) (-2.97) (-2.54) (-2.65) 
QIB Over Subscription 0.002 
  
0.004** 
  
0.005** 
  
 
(0.95) 
  
(1.99) 
  
(2.32) 
  Retail Over Subscription 
 
0.011*** 
  
0.011*** 
  
0.014*** 
 
  
(4.43) 
  
(3.61) 
  
(3.40) 
 Non-Institutional Over Subscription 
  
0.004** 
  
0.005** 
  
0.006*** 
   
(2.53) 
  
(2.55) 
  
(2.76) 
VC 0.028 -0.074 -0.037 0.198 0.093 0.117 0.122 -0.006 0.021 
 
(0.12) (-0.36) (-0.17) (0.79) (0.39) (0.48) (0.47) (-0.03) (0.09) 
Underwriter Reputation 0.014 0.023 0.036 0.028 0.035 0.053* 0.023 0.033 0.055* 
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(0.59) (1.04) (1.45) (1.14) (1.48) (1.94) (0.87) (1.28) (1.93) 
Group Affiliation -0.196 -0.148 -0.132 -0.095 -0.095 -0.059 -0.045 -0.043 0.003 
 
(-1.58) (-1.44) (-1.17) (-0.62) (-0.72) (-0.42) (-0.32) (-0.35) (0.02) 
Analyst Recommendation 0.296** 0.233** 0.244** 0.196 0.174 0.169 0.189 0.161 0.153 
 
(2.22) (2.06) (2.01) (1.40) (1.46) (1.34) (1.35) (1.35) (1.23) 
Method 0.082 0.185 0.138 -0.260 -0.157 -0.193 -0.451 -0.325 -0.368 
 
(0.26) (0.60) (0.44) (-0.69) (-0.44) (-0.54) (-1.47) (-1.16) (-1.30) 
Offer Price -0.245** -0.190* -0.284** -0.139 -0.047 -0.154 -0.152 -0.040 -0.173 
 
(-2.20) (-1.91) (-2.53) (-1.27) (-0.45) (-1.33) (-1.23) (-0.34) (-1.33) 
Issue Size -0.086 -0.042 -0.125* -0.078 -0.021 -0.114 -0.070 -0.001 -0.115 
 
(-1.28) (-0.68) (-1.76) (-0.95) (-0.29) (-1.27) (-0.88) (-0.01) (-1.25) 
RONW -0.110 -0.081 0.028 0.399 0.341 0.490 0.267 0.197 0.384 
 
(-0.39) (-0.29) (0.10) (1.25) (1.00) (1.45) (0.92) (0.62) (1.21) 
Chg Promoter Shareholdings -0.160 -0.243 -0.285 -2.507** -2.388** -2.484** -2.111** -1.971** -2.094** 
 
(-0.16) (-0.26) (-0.29) (-2.21) (-2.02) (-2.17) (-2.25) (-2.03) (-2.19) 
Total Assets 0.008 0.002 0.022 0.042 0.039* 0.062*** 0.035 0.032 0.060*** 
 
(0.34) (0.08) (1.27) (1.62) (1.69) (3.11) (1.39) (1.37) (3.01) 
Age 0.014 0.022 0.021 0.042 0.071 0.069 -0.038 -0.004 -0.007 
 
(0.12) (0.22) (0.21) (0.36) (0.67) (0.64) (-0.33) (-0.04) (-0.07) 
Adj. R
2 0.302 0.379 0.342 0.244 0.290 0.276 0.225 0.301 0.281 
F-statistic 3.20*** 4.09*** 3.64*** 2.64*** 3.07*** 2.94*** 2.47*** 3.19*** 2.99** 
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Table 3 Underpricing Regression Results (CONTINUE) 
 
The dependent variable is underpricing.  We measured the underpricing as the offer-to-close return, [(closing price – offer price) / 
offer price], on the listing day, 2-day, 5-day, 10-day and 20-day in Model 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, respectively.  GMP Residual is the 
adjusted grey market premium measured by regressing grey market premium on the quality variables, i.e. Grading, VC, UW 
Reputation, Group Affiliation, Analyst Recommend, Offer Price, Issue Size, RONW, Chg_Promoter, Total Assets and Age.  Grading 
is the actual grade assigned by the grading agencies and ranges from 1 to 5; for non-graded IPOs we assigned the value of 0.  VC 
takes the value of 1 if the IPO is backed by venture capital; zero otherwise.  UW Reputation is the investment bank’s reputation 
measured by the market share of the proceeds and overallotment shares raised during 2006 – 2008.  Group Affiliation is a dummy 
variable which equals 1 if the IPO is group affiliated; zero otherwise.  Analyst Recommend is the dummy variable which equals 1 if 
the IPO is recommended for subscription; (avoid) zero otherwise.  Method is the dummy variable which equals 1 if IPO method is 
fixed-price; zero otherwise.  Offer Price is the logarithm of IPO offer price.  Issue Size is the logarithm of number of shares offered.  
RONW is the return on net worth prior to the IPO as reported in the prospectus.  Chg_Promoter Shares is the ratio of post-IPO 
promoter shares and pre-IPO promoter shares.  Total Assets is prior to the IPO and is collected from prospectus.  Age is the logarithm 
of number of years from incorporated year to IPO year.  
*
, 
**
, and 
***
 represent the 10%, 5%, and 1% two-tailed significance level, 
respectively. The t-statistics in the parentheses are White heteroskedasticity-consistent. 
 
 
Model 4 
  
Model 5 
  Intercept 2.940* 0.840 3.640* 1.937 -0.229 2.364 
 
(1.76) (0.53) (1.87) (1.47) (-0.15) (1.36) 
GMP Residual 0.071 0.012 -0.035 0.057 0.052 -0.011 
 
(0.56) (0.14) (-0.43) (0.44) (0.54) (-0.12) 
GRADING -0.118*** -0.093** -0.102** -0.145*** -0.127*** -0.132*** 
 
(-2.78) (-2.33) (-2.45) (-3.72) (-3.33) (-3.29) 
QIB Over Subscription 0.005** 
  
0.006** 
  
 
(2.12) 
  
(2.36) 
  Retail Over Subscription 
 
0.017*** 
  
0.015** 
 
  
(3.29) 
  
(2.55) 
 Non-Institutional Over Subscription 
  
0.007*** 
  
0.007*** 
   
(2.97) 
  
(2.82) 
VC 0.211 0.052 0.083 0.245 0.103 0.121 
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(0.71) (0.21) (0.33) (0.87) (0.47) (0.53) 
Underwriter Reputation 0.018 0.030 0.060* 0.009 0.018 0.048 
 
(0.56) (1.04) (1.85) (0.30) (0.68) (1.69) 
Group Affiliation -0.130 -0.106 -0.043 -0.033 -0.043 0.027 
 
(-0.88) (-0.83) (-0.32) (-0.21) (-0.31) (0.19) 
Analyst Recommendation 0.339** 0.285** 0.270* 0.295* 0.275** 0.249* 
 
(1.98) (2.06) (1.91) (1.93) (2.16) (1.94) 
Method -0.505 -0.347 -0.397 -0.521** -0.382* -0.418* 
 
(-1.55) (-1.21) (-1.36) (-1.99) (-1.68) (-1.85) 
Offer Price -0.204 -0.080 -0.250* -0.239** -0.107 -0.266** 
 
(-1.50) (-0.62) (-1.73) (-2.26) (-0.96) (-2.22) 
Issue Size -0.024 0.057 -0.089 0.005 0.084 -0.051 
 
(-0.27) (0.64) (-0.86) (0.06) (0.86) (-0.49) 
RONW 0.177 0.129 0.375 0.147 0.047 0.294 
 
(0.57) (0.38) (1.08) (0.45) (0.13) (0.78) 
Chg Promoter Shareholdings -1.978** -1.891** -2.062** -1.094 -0.886 -1.078 
 
(-2.09) (-1.96) (-2.15) (-1.24) (-0.98) (-1.18) 
Total Assets 0.030 0.025 0.061*** 0.026 0.024 0.057** 
 
(1.08) (0.92) (2.60) (0.89) (0.82) (2.12) 
Age -0.135 -0.102 -0.105 -0.103 -0.060 -0.065 
 
(-1.01) (-0.88) (-0.94) (-0.87) (-0.56) (-0.61) 
Adj. R
2 0.192 0.304 0.286 0.286 0.359 0.364 
F-statistic 2.20** 3.22*** 3.03*** 3.03*** 3.84*** 3.90*** 
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Table 4 Underpricing Measured from Grey Market Prices Results 
 
The dependent variable is underpricing measured from grey market price-to-close returns, [(closing price – grey market price) / grey market price], on the listing day, 2-day, 5-day, 
10-day and 20-day in Model 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, respectively.  GMP Residual is the adjusted grey market premium measured by regressing grey market premium on the quality variables, 
i.e. Grading, VC, UW Reputation, Group Affiliation, Analyst Recommend, Offer Price, Issue Size, RONW, Chg_Promoter, Total Assets and Age.  Grading is the actual grade 
assigned by the grading agencies and ranges from 1 to 5; for non-graded IPOs we assigned the value of 0.  VC takes the value of 1 if the IPO is backed by venture capital; zero 
otherwise.  UW Reputation is the investment bank’s reputation measured by the market share of the proceeds and overallotment shares raised during 2006 – 2008.  Group Affiliation is 
a dummy variable which equals 1 if the IPO is group affiliated; zero otherwise.  Analyst Recommend is the dummy variable which equals 1 if the IPO is recommended for 
subscription; (avoid) zero otherwise.  Method is the dummy variable which equals 1 if IPO method is fixed-price; zero otherwise.  Offer Price is the logarithm of IPO offer price.  
Issue Size is the logarithm of number of shares offered.  RONW is the return on net worth prior to the IPO as reported in the prospectus.  Chg_Promoter Shares is the ratio of post-IPO 
promoter shares and pre-IPO promoter shares.  Total Assets is prior to the IPO and is collected from prospectus.  Age is the logarithm of number of years from incorporated year to 
IPO year.  
*
, 
**
, and 
***
 represent the 10%, 5%, and 1% two-tailed significance level, respectively. The t-statistics in the parentheses are White heteroskedasticity-consistent. 
 
 
Model 1 
   
Model 2 
   
Model 3 
   Intercept 2.208** 2.193** 1.897** 1.801* 2.531** 2.586** 2.169** 2.062* 2.327** 2.612** 1.970* 2.084* 
 
(2.33) (2.13) (2.10) (1.72) (2.44) (2.31) (2.22) (1.76) (2.06) (2.14) (1.85) (1.66) 
GMP Residual 0.010 -0.042 0.016 0.013 0.023 -0.044 0.027 0.028 0.007 -0.081 -0.004 -0.008 
 
(0.32) (-0.68) (0.39) (0.25) (0.73) (-0.69) (0.66) (0.51) (0.23) (-1.37) (-0.09) (-0.16) 
GRADING -0.046* -0.046* -0.051** -0.051** -0.053* -0.052* -0.059** -0.058** -0.057** -0.054** -0.060 -0.060** 
 
(-1.86) (-1.85) (-2.02) (-2.01) (-1.89) (-1.86) (-2.00) (-1.99) (-2.10) (-2.01) (-2.02) (-2.07) 
QIB Over Subscription 
 
0.002 
   
0.002 
   
0.003 
  
  
(1.129) 
   
(1.46) 
   
(2.01) 
  Retail Over Subscription 
  
-0.001 
   
-0.001 
   
0.001 
 
   
(-0.39) 
   
(-0.30) 
   
(0.23) 
 Non-Institutional Over Subscription 
   
-0.0002 
   
-0.0003 
   
0.0003 
    
(-0.20) 
   
(-0.241) 
   
(0.30) 
VC -0.083 -0.020 -0.015 -0.019 -0.063 0.009 0.012 0.010 -0.118 -0.059 -0.068 -0.068 
 
(-0.57) (-0.14) (-0.10) (-0.12) (-0.39) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (-0.83) (-0.42) (-0.45) (-0.45) 
Underwriter Reputation 0.040** 0.035** 0.033* 0.033* 0.046** 0.041** 0.038** 0.037* 0.041** 0.037** 0.036* 0.037* 
 
(2.33) (2.22) (1.92) (1.76) (2.40) (2.34) (1.97) (1.74) (2.06) (2.05) (1.73) (1.65) 
Group Affiliation -0.018 -0.019 -0.057 -0.056 0.035 0.040 -0.007 -0.009 0.054 0.080 0.029 0.033 
 
(-0.19) (-0.18) (-0.60) (-0.57) (0.30) (0.31) (-0.07) (-0.08) (0.50) (0.69) (0.27) (0.30) 
 30 
Analyst Recommendation 0.016 -0.034 0.001 -0.002 0.031 -0.031 0.012 0.012 0.027 -0.042 0.002 0.00005 
 
(0.17) (-0.37) (0.01) (-0.02) (0.30) (-0.30) (0.13) (0.12) (0.27) (-0.44) (0.02) (0.0005) 
Method -0.153 -0.156 -0.163 -0.158 -0.187 -0.191 -0.196 -0.194 -0.313 -0.316 -0.310 -0.310 
 
(-0.65) (-0.66) (-0.71) (-0.69) (-0.66) (-0.67) (-0.70) (-0.70) (-1.33) (-1.34) (-1.34) (-1.35) 
Offer Price -0.096 -0.098 -0.075 -0.070 -0.100 -0.107 -0.076 -0.070 -0.086 -0.109 -0.064 -0.071 
 
(-1.19) (-1.17) (-0.97) (-0.83) (-1.17) (-1.22) (-0.91) (-0.77) (-0.90) (-1.10) (-0.69) (-0.70) 
Issue Size -0.099* -0.078 -0.072 -0.067 -0.099* -0.078 -0.069 -0.063 -0.090* -0.079 -0.062 -0.068 
 
(-1.89) (-1.45) (-1.45) (-1.15) (-1.73) (-1.30) (-1.28) (-0.97) (-1.70) (-1.43) (-1.25) (-1.12) 
RONW 0.201 0.343 0.277 0.273 0.239 0.411* 0.326 0.318 0.137 0.317 0.217 0.229 
 
(0.89) (1.61) (1.29) 1.23 (0.91) (1.70) (1.31) (1.23) (0.60) (1.46) (0.96) (0.97) 
Chg Promoter Shareholdings -1.035 -1.401* -1.247 -1.249 -1.391 -1.830** -1.633* -1.628* -1.140 -1.589** -1.358* -1.369* 
 
(-1.35) (-1.87) (-1.60) (-1.63) (-1.61) (-2.19) (-1.86) (-1.88) (-1.59) (-2.29) (-1.87) (-1.90) 
Total Assets 0.025* 0.024 0.027* 0.025* 0.029* 0.027 0.031* 0.030* 0.026* 0.023 0.027 0.028* 
 
(1.76) (1.55) (1.87) (1.76) (1.77) (1.53) (1.88) (1.76) (1.68) (1.37) (1.70) (1.78) 
Age 0.092 0.054 0.068 0.068 0.061 0.014 0.033 0.033 0.009 -0.037 -0.013 -0.013 
 
(1.19) (0.70) (0.95) (0.94) (0.70) (0.18) (0.42) (0.42) (0.11) (-0.46) (-0.17) (-0.17) 
Adj. R
2
 0.035 0.046 0.038 0.037 0.027 0.041 0.029 0.029 0.012 0.030 0.006 0.006 
F-statistic 1.20 1.24 1.20 1.19 1.15 1.21 1.15 1.15 1.07 1.15 1.03 1.03 
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Table 4 Underpricing Measured from Grey Market Prices Results (CONTINUE) 
 
The dependent variable is underpricing measured from grey market price-to-close returns, [(closing price – grey market price) / grey 
market price], on the listing day, 2-day, 5-day, 10-day and 20-day in Model 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, respectively.  GMP Residual is the adjusted 
grey market premium measured by regressing grey market premium on the quality variables, i.e. Grading, VC, UW Reputation, Group 
Affiliation, Analyst Recommend, Offer Price, Issue Size, RONW, Chg_Promoter, Total Assets and Age.  Grading is the actual grade 
assigned by the grading agencies and ranges from 1 to 5; for non-graded IPOs we assigned the value of 0.  VC takes the value of 1 if the 
IPO is backed by venture capital; zero otherwise.  UW Reputation is the investment bank’s reputation measured by the market share of 
the proceeds and overallotment shares raised during 2006 – 2008.  Group Affiliation is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the IPO is 
group affiliated; zero otherwise.  Analyst Recommend is the dummy variable which equals 1 if the IPO is recommended for subscription; 
(avoid) zero otherwise.  Method is the dummy variable which equals 1 if IPO method is fixed-price; zero otherwise.  Offer Price is the 
logarithm of IPO offer price.  Issue Size is the logarithm of number of shares offered.  RONW is the return on net worth prior to the IPO 
as reported in the prospectus.  Chg_Promoter Shares is the ratio of post-IPO promoter shares and pre-IPO promoter shares.  Total Assets 
is prior to the IPO and is collected from prospectus.  Age is the logarithm of number of years from incorporated year to IPO year.  
*
, 
**
, 
and 
***
 represent the 10%, 5%, and 1% two-tailed significance level, respectively. The t-statistics in the parentheses are White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent. 
 
 
Model 4 
   
Model 5 
   Intercept 2.204* 2.540* 1.741 2.125 1.221 1.717* 0.932 1.119 
 
(1.73) (1.88) (1.45) (1.52) (1.25) (1.74) (0.96) (1.07) 
GMP Residual -0.009 -0.106 -0.038 -0.050 0.005 -0.104 -0.001 -0.022 
 
(-0.25) (-1.55) (-0.67) (-0.81) (0.15) (-1.34) (-0.02) (-0.35) 
GRADING -0.057** -0.053 -0.057* -0.057* -0.080*** -0.074*** -0.083*** -0.080 
 
(-2.00) (-1.87) (-1.81) (-1.86) (-2.81) (-2.76) (-2.75) (-2.68) 
QIB Over Subscription 
 
0.003** 
   
0.004 
  
  
(2.06) 
   
(2.09) 
  Retail Over Subscription 
  
0.002 
   
0.0003 
 
   
(0.72) 
   
(0.10) 
 Non-Institutional Over Subscription 
   
0.001 
   
0.001 
    
(0.92) 
   
(0.60) 
VC -0.093 -0.030 -0.053 -0.052 -0.088 -0.037 -0.044 -0.053 
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(-0.62) (-0.20) (-0.34) (-0.33) (-0.63) (-0.27) (-0.31) (-0.37) 
Underwriter Reputation 0.039 0.036 0.035 0.040 0.031* 0.030* 0.027 0.031 
 
(1.82) (1.78) (1.57) (1.62) (1.70) (1.83) (1.44) (1.49) 
Group Affiliation -0.008 0.023 -0.025 -0.012 0.065 0.111 0.042 0.058 
 
(-0.08) (0.21) (-0.24) (-0.12) (0.52) (0.82) (0.34) (0.47) 
Analyst Recommendation 0.142 0.066 0.104 0.098 0.109  0.030 0.090 0.077 
 
(1.25) (0.59) (0.92) (0.88) (0.93) (0.27) (0.81) (0.71) 
Method -0.319 -0.322 -0.302 -0.306 -0.321 -0.324 -0.320 -0.313 
 
(-1.33) (-1.34) (-1.30) (-1.30) (-1.61) (-1.62) (-1.57) (-1.56) 
Offer Price -0.117 -0.144 -0.089 -0.113 -0.131 -0.169** -0.113 -0.126 
 
(-1.11) (-1.31) (-0.88) (-1.01) (-1.57) (-2.01) (-1.34) (-1.46) 
Issue Size -0.072 -0.061 -0.038 -0.058 -0.044 -0.041 -0.021 -0.030 
 
(-1.25) (-1.03) (-0.69) (-0.88) (-0.82) (-0.78) (-0.39) (-0.52) 
RONW 0.068 0.264 0.164 0.204 -0.007 0.189 0.058 0.093 
 
(0.28) (1.17) (0.69) (0.82) (-0.03) (0.70) (0.21) (0.31) 
Chg Promoter Shareholdings -1.009 -1.498** -1.269* -1.303* -0.213 -0.694 -0.392 -0.436 
 
(-1.44) (-2.24) (-1.81) (-1.87) (-0.31) (-1.00) (-0.54) (-0.60) 
Total Assets 0.025 0.021 0.024 0.029* 0.020 0.016 0.021 0.023 
 
(1.47) (1.18) (1.44) (1.74) (1.03) (0.78) (1.10) (1.12) 
Age -0.042 -0.093 -0.067 -0.068 -0.009 -0.058 -0.028 -0.029 
 
(-0.46) (-1.06) (-0.75) (-0.77) (-0.11) (-0.83) (-0.35) (-0.38) 
Adj. R
2 -0.045 -0.025 -0.048 -0.047 -0.025 -0.006 -0.046 -0.043 
F-statistic 0.76 0.87 0.77 0.77 0.87 0.97 0.78 0.79 
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Table 5 Time-Series Regression Results of Market Returns Post-IPO 
 
The dependent variable is market return post-IPO.  We measure the market return as [(closing price – previous day closing price) / previous day closing price], during 20-day, 30-day, 60-day, 90-day and 120-
day windows post-IPO, respectively, in Model 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5.  Time is the time trend measured during the estimation windows.  GMP Residual is the adjusted grey market premium measured by regressing grey 
market premium on the quality variables, i.e. Grading, VC, UW Reputation, Group Affiliation, Analyst Recommend, Offer Price, Issue Size, RONW, Chg_Promoter, Total Assets and Age.  Grading is the actual 
grade assigned by the grading agencies and ranges from 1 to 5; for non-graded IPOs we assigned the value of 0.  VC takes the value of 1 if the IPO is backed by venture capital; zero otherwise.  UW Reputation 
is the investment bank’s reputation measured by the market share of the proceeds and overallotment shares raised during 2006 – 2008.  Group Affiliation is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the IPO is group 
affiliated; zero otherwise.  Analyst Recommend is the dummy variable which equals 1 if the IPO is recommended for subscription; (avoid) zero otherwise.  Method is the dummy variable which equals 1 if IPO 
method is fixed-price; zero otherwise.  Offer Price is the logarithm of IPO offer price.  Issue Size is the logarithm of number of shares offered.  RONW is the return on net worth prior to the IPO as reported in the 
prospectus.  Chg_Promoter Shares is the ratio of post-IPO promoter shares and pre-IPO promoter shares.  Total Assets is prior to the IPO and is collected from prospectus.  Age is the logarithm of number of 
years from incorporated year to IPO year.  *, **, and *** represent the 10%, 5%, and 1% two-tailed significance level, respectively. The t-statistics in the parentheses are White heteroskedasticity-consistent. 
 
 
Model 1 
   
Model 2 
   
Model 3 
   
Intercept 16.019 16.459* 7.256 17.895 10.199 9.675 3.580 11.110 3.575 3.262 0.746 3.681 
 
(1.59) (1.69) (0.79) (1.54) (1.48) (1.44) (0.57) (1.40) (0.98) (0.91) (0.22) (0.88) 
Time -0.354*** -0.322*** -0.322*** -0.322*** -0.154*** -0.142*** -0.142*** -0.142*** -0.038*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.034*** 
 
(-3.22) (-3.05) (-3.05) (-3.05) (-3.04) (-2.91) (-2.91) (-2.91) (-2.86) (-2.64) (-2.64) (-2.64) 
GMP Residual 1.287** 0.479 0.465 0.246 0.783** 0.275 0.182 0.053 0.322* 0.110 0.076 0.043 
 
(2.38) (0.52) (0.76) (0.34) (2.07) (0.43) (0.41) (0.10) (1.64) (0.33) (0.33) (0.16) 
GRADING -0.704*** -0.693** -0.617** -0.645*** -0.514*** -0.517*** -0.455*** -0.478*** -0.296*** -0.298*** -0.273*** -0.285*** 
 
(-2.70) (-2.55) (-2.53) (-2.65) (-2.85) (-2.77) (-2.70) (-2.84) (-3.11) (-3.02) (-3.02) (-3.17) 
QIB Over Subscription 
 
0.027 
   
0.017 
   
0.007 
  
  
(1.40) 
   
(1.24) 
   
(0.98) 
  
Retail Over Subscription 
  
0.062 
   
0.045 
   
0.019 
 
   
(1.00) 
   
(1.06) 
   
(0.85) 
 
Non-Institutional Over Subscription 
   
0.029 
   
0.020 
   
0.008 
    
(1.09) 
   
(1.11) 
   
(0.82) 
VC 0.047 0.884 0.288 0.380 0.062 0.718 0.289 0.370 0.171 0.452 0.277 0.319 
 
(0.03) (0.53) (0.20) (0.26) (0.05) (0.63) (0.30) (0.37) (0.27) (0.76) (0.54) (0.60) 
Underwriter Reputation 0.172 0.113 0.154 0.271 0.144 0.093 0.125 0.205* 0.055 0.033 0.046 0.075 
 
(0.93) (0.64) (0.99) (1.60) (1.13) (0.77) (1.17) (1.75) (0.81) (0.51) (0.79) (1.17) 
Group Affiliation -0.423 -0.350 -0.398 -0.133 -0.242 -0.273 -0.252 -0.081 -0.023 -0.040 -0.034 0.021 
 
(-0.45) (-0.34) (-0.47) (-0.14) (-0.37) (-0.38) (-0.42) (-0.12) (-0.07) (-0.11) (-0.11) (0.06) 
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Analyst Recommendation 2.344** 1.611* 1.533** 1.450* 1.758*** 1.255* 1.149** 1.108** 0.796** 0.584 0.543* 0.538* 
 
(2.53) (1.64) (1.99) (1.84) (2.75) (1.84) (2.12) (2.00) (2.32) (1.61) (1.82) (1.77) 
Method -1.365 -1.401 -0.817 -0.984 -0.756 -0.783 -0.359 -0.493 0.021 0.009 0.183 0.119 
 
(-0.59) (-0.60) (-0.37) (-0.45) (-0.48) (-0.49) (-0.24) (-0.33) (0.03) (0.01) (0.24) (0.15) 
Offer Price -1.040 -1.134 -0.573 -1.221 -0.842* -0.847 -0.482 -0.939 -0.295 -0.295 -0.144 -0.321 
 
(-1.42) (-1.50) (-0.87) (-1.42) (-1.67) (-1.61) (-1.06) (-1.59) (-1.10) (-1.05) (-0.58) (-1.03) 
Issue Size -0.460 -0.211 0.125 -0.429 -0.345 -0.124 0.105 -0.287 -0.160 -0.064 0.031 -0.122 
 
(-0.72) (-0.36) (0.20) (-0.73) (-0.79) (-0.31) (0.24) (-0.71) (-0.69) (-0.30) (0.13) (-0.57) 
RONW -0.639 1.407 0.976 1.953 -0.129 1.326 1.116 1.781 0.073 0.689 0.599 0.841 
 
(-0.30) (0.69) (0.51) (0.90) (-0.09) (0.93) (0.84) (1.17) (0.09) (0.89) (0.83) (1.03) 
Chg Promoter Shareholdings -2.658 -7.863 -6.959 -7.682 -0.340 -4.079 -3.662 -4.127 0.548 -1.039 -0.858 -1.007 
 
(-0.39) (-1.29) (-1.04) (-1.13) (-0.07) (-0.98) (-0.80) (-0.89) (0.23) (-0.47) (-0.36) (-0.41) 
Total Assets 0.213 0.192 0.183 0.321** 0.128 0.117 0.107 0.204* 0.069 0.065 0.061 0.099* 
 
(1.53) (1.32) (1.25) (2.03) (1.32) (1.16) (1.05) (1.86) (1.31) (1.19) (1.10) (1.66) 
Age 0.385 -0.158 0.024 0.008 0.450 0.059 0.167 0.157 0.208 0.041 0.087 0.084 
 
(0.42) (-0.17) (0.03) (0.01) (0.71) (0.09) (0.27) (0.26) (0.63) (0.13) (0.27) (0.26) 
Adj. R2 0.024 0.024 0.026 0.025 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006 
F-statistic 3.51*** 3.32*** 3.52*** 3.50*** 3.34*** 3.14*** 3.39*** 3.35*** 2.81*** 2.53*** 2.67*** 2.62*** 
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Table 5 Time-Series Regression Results of Market Returns Post-IPO (CONTINUE) 
 
The dependent variable is market return post-IPO.  We measure the market return as [(closing price – previous day closing price) / previous day 
closing price], during 20-day, 30-day, 60-day, 90-day and 120-day windows post-IPO, respectively, in Model 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5.  Time is the time 
trend measured during the estimation windows.  GMP Residual is the adjusted grey market premium measured by regressing grey market premium 
on the quality variables, i.e. Grading, VC, UW Reputation, Group Affiliation, Analyst Recommend, Offer Price, Issue Size, RONW, 
Chg_Promoter, Total Assets and Age.  Grading is the actual grade assigned by the grading agencies and ranges from 1 to 5; for non-graded IPOs 
we assigned the value of 0.  VC takes the value of 1 if the IPO is backed by venture capital; zero otherwise.  UW Reputation is the investment 
bank’s reputation measured by the market share of the proceeds and overallotment shares raised during 2006 – 2008.  Group Affiliation is a 
dummy variable which equals 1 if the IPO is group affiliated; zero otherwise.  Analyst Recommend is the dummy variable which equals 1 if the 
IPO is recommended for subscription; (avoid) zero otherwise.  Method is the dummy variable which equals 1 if IPO method is fixed-price; zero 
otherwise.  Offer Price is the logarithm of IPO offer price.  Issue Size is the logarithm of number of shares offered.  RONW is the return on net 
worth prior to the IPO as reported in the prospectus.  Chg_Promoter Shares is the ratio of post-IPO promoter shares and pre-IPO promoter shares.  
Total Assets is prior to the IPO and is collected from prospectus.  Age is the logarithm of number of years from incorporated year to IPO year.  
*
, 
**
, 
and 
***
 represent the 10%, 5%, and 1% two-tailed significance level, respectively. The t-statistics in the parentheses are White heteroskedasticity-
consistent. 
 
 
Model 4 
   
Model 5 
   Intercept 1.653 1.507 -0.283 2.114 1.195 0.687 -0.588 1.764 
 
(0.65) (0.60) (-0.12) (0.73) (0.59) (0.34) (-0.31) (0.77) 
Time -0.017*** -0.015** -0.015** -0.015** -0.008** -0.007** -0.007** -0.007** 
 
(-2.71) (-2.49) (-2.49) (-2.49) (-2.31) (-2.10) (-2.10) (-2.10) 
GMP Residual 0.258* 0.106 0.085 0.014 0.177* 0.100 0.004 -0.057 
 
(1.90) (0.46) (0.52) (0.07) (1.70) (0.56) (0.03) (-0.39) 
GRADING -0.232*** -0.232*** -0.215*** -0.218*** -0.183 -0.189*** -0.164*** -0.169*** 
 
(-3.45) (-3.34) (-3.36) (-3.41) (-3.42) (-3.40) (-3.19) (-3.29) 
QIB Over Subscription 
 
0.005 
   
0.002 
  
  
(1.00) 
   
(0.61) 
  Retail Over Subscription 
  
0.013 
   
0.013 
 
   
(0.87) 
   
(1.17) 
 Non-Institutional Over Subscription 
   
0.007 
   
0.006 
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(1.07) 
   
(1.35) 
VC 0.295 0.485 0.362 0.369 0.283 0.446 0.324 0.337 
 
(0.68) (1.17) (1.01) (0.99) (0.83) (1.37) (1.14) (1.14) 
Underwriter Reputation 0.048 0.034 0.043 0.072 0.024 0.010 0.021 0.049 
 
(1.02) (0.74) (1.03) (1.59) (0.63) (0.27) (0.62) (1.30) 
Group Affiliation -0.003 -0.008 -0.006 0.068 -0.012 -0.053 -0.001 0.065 
 
(-0.01) (-0.03) (-0.03) (0.27) (-0.06) (-0.25) (-0.01) (0.33) 
Analyst Recommendation 0.555** 0.407 0.381* 0.348 0.456** 0.359* 0.288 0.262 
 
(2.27) (1.57) (1.74) (1.57) (2.33) (1.74) (1.61) (1.45) 
Method 0.309 0.301 0.423 0.399 0.016 0.009 0.132 0.102 
 
(0.55) (0.53) (0.79) (0.74) (0.04) (0.02) (0.32) (0.25) 
Offer Price -0.110 -0.114 -0.006 -0.154 -0.091 -0.066 0.004 -0.140 
 
(-0.59) (-0.58) (-0.04) (-0.71) (-0.62) (-0.42) (0.03) (-0.83) 
Issue Size -0.141 -0.077 -0.011 -0.135 -0.065 -0.001 0.054 -0.069 
 
(-0.88) (-0.53) (-0.07) (-0.90) (-0.52) (-0.01) (0.43) (-0.57) 
RONW 0.678 1.105** 1.037** 1.279** 0.355 0.658 0.683* 0.911** 
 
(1.24) (2.00) (2.02) (2.22) (0.82) (1.50) (1.68) (2.00) 
Chg Promoter Shareholdings -0.223 -1.318 -1.181 -1.384 -0.400 -1.194 -1.273 -1.455 
 
(-0.14) (-0.86) (-0.72) (-0.82) (-0.31) (-1.00) (-0.99) (-1.12) 
Total Assets 0.080** 0.077** 0.074* 0.105** 0.051* 0.051 0.044 0.075** 
 
(2.14) (1.98) (1.90) (2.51) (1.66) (1.62) (1.39) (2.21) 
Age 0.377 0.262 0.295 0.290 0.161 0.077 0.089 0.085 
 
(1.63) (1.14) (1.31) (1.28) (0.89) (0.43) (0.50) (0.48) 
Adj. R
2 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 
F-statistic 3.16*** 2.93*** 3.07*** 3.11*** 2.52*** 2.36*** 2.67*** 2.70*** 
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Table 6 Listing Day Trading Volume Regression Results 
 
The dependent variables are the logarithm of listing day trading volume and the ratio of trading volume to 
shares outstanding post-IPO which are presented in Panel A and B, respectively.  GMP Residual is the 
adjusted grey market premium measured by regressing grey market premium on the quality variables, i.e. 
Grading, VC, UW Reputation, Group Affiliation, Analyst Recommend, Offer Price, Issue Size, RONW, 
Chg_Promoter, Total Assets and Age.  Grading is the actual grade assigned by the grading agencies and 
ranges from 1 to 5; for non-graded IPOs we assigned the value of 0.  VC takes the value of 1 if the IPO is 
backed by venture capital; zero otherwise.  UW Reputation is the investment bank’s reputation measured by 
the market share of the proceeds and overallotment shares raised during 2006 – 2008.  Group Affiliation is a 
dummy variable which equals 1 if the IPO is group affiliated; zero otherwise.  Analyst Recommend is the 
dummy variable which equals 1 if the IPO is recommended for subscription; (avoid) zero otherwise.  
Method is the dummy variable which equals 1 if IPO method is fixed-price; zero otherwise.  Offer Price is 
the logarithm of IPO offer price.  Issue Size is the logarithm of number of shares offered.  RONW is the 
return on net worth prior to the IPO as reported in the prospectus.  Chg_Promoter Shares is the ratio of 
post-IPO promoter shares and pre-IPO promoter shares.  Total Assets is prior to the IPO and is collected 
from prospectus.  Age is the logarithm of number of years from incorporated year to IPO year.  
*
, 
**
, and 
***
 
represent the 10%, 5%, and 1% two-tailed significance level, respectively. The t-statistics in the parentheses 
are White heteroskedasticity-consistent. 
 
 
Logarithm of Trading Volume Trading Volume / Shares Outstanding 
Intercept 10.661*** 11.083*** 10.529*** 13.383** 13.289*** 14.106** 
 
(5.33) (5.60) (5.05) (2.53) (2.65) (2.51) 
GMP Residual -0.015 -0.043 0.006 0.195 -0.031 0.094 
 
(-0.12) (-0.49) (0.06) (1.03) (-0.27) (0.73) 
GRADING 0.025 0.026 0.022 0.065 0.098 0.074 
 
(0.56) (0.56) (0.47) (0.78) (1.11) (0.90) 
QIB Over Subscription -0.002 
  
-0.003 
  
 
(-0.54) 
  
(-0.60) 
  Retail Over Subscription 
 
-0.001 
  
0.012 
 
  
(-0.28) 
  
(0.89) 
 Non-Institutional Over Subscription 
  
-0.002 
  
0.001 
   
(-0.89) 
  
(0.16) 
VC 0.232 0.247 0.266 -1.072 -1.172 -1.077 
 
(0.86) (0.90) (0.98) (-1.32) (-1.38) (-1.33) 
Underwriter Reputation -0.042 -0.042 -0.053 0.052 0.065 0.057 
 
(-1.19) (-1.17) (-1.37) (0.86) (1.01) (0.88) 
Group Affiliation -0.087 -0.067 -0.105 -0.431 -0.291 -0.363 
 
(-0.52) (-0.45) (-0.65) (-1.31) (-1.03) (-1.18) 
Analyst Recommendation -0.086 -0.101 -0.072 0.324 0.178 0.264 
 
(-0.52) (-0.64) (-0.44) (0.80) (0.52) (0.71) 
Method -0.144 -0.158 -0.172 0.413 0.520 0.420 
 
(-0.37) (-0.40) (-0.44) (0.42) (0.53) (0.43) 
Offer Price -0.284 -0.312 -0.276 -1.214* -1.227* -1.266* 
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(-1.39) (-1.51) (-1.29) (-1.76) (-1.80) (-1.76) 
Issue Size 0.575*** 0.562*** 0.590 -0.438** -0.416* -0.460* 
 
(5.90) (5.41) (5.66) (-2.00) (-1.92) (-1.95) 
RONW -0.353 -0.308 -0.396 -1.125 -0.927 -0.995 
 
(-0.86) (-0.81) (-0.96) (-1.13) (-1.06) (-1.06) 
Chg Promoter Shareholdings -0.428 -0.531 -0.426 4.309 3.831 4.034 
 
(-0.27) (-0.36) (-0.28) (0.88) (0.84) (0.86) 
Total Assets -0.044 -0.045 -0.052 -0.112* -0.125* -0.115* 
 
(-1.27) (-1.29) (-1.47) (-1.68) (-1.74) (-1.66) 
Age -0.383** -0.396*** -0.393*** -0.521 -0.551 -0.545 
 
(-2.54) (-2.77) (-2.74) (-1.56) (-1.62) (-1.62) 
Adj. R
2 0.409 0.408 0.412 0.198 0.206 0.197 
F-statistic 4.51*** 4.50*** 4.56*** 2.25** 2.31** 2.25** 
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Table 7 Investment Strategies of Retail Bidders 
 
This table presents the two investment strategies of retail bidders.  Panel A strategy is selling at grey market premium (GMP) on day before listing.  Deliver on listing day to cover the 
position.  Return is measured as (Selling Price - Buying Price)/Buying Price.  Selling price = GMP + offer price; Buying Price = (1/Retail over subscription) * (Offer Price) + {1-(1/Retail 
over subscription)} * (closing price on listing day).  Panel B strategy is buying at GMP plus offer price from grey market, and sell at listing day closing price, i.e. days 2, 5,10,20 etc.  
Excess return is the abnormal return relative to the market return measured by the Sensex index market return.  The mean and median comparisons of low and high GMP residual samples 
in panel A and that of low and high oversubscription samples are based on the independent t-test and Wilcoxon Signed Rank test, respectively.  
***
, 
**
, and 
* 
represent significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels for a two-tailed test, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Strategy A 
 
Low 
GMP Residual 
(39) 
High 
GMP Residual 
(35) Difference 
Low 
GMP Residual 
(39) 
High 
GMP Residual 
(35) Dfference 
 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean t-test median 
Wilcoxon 
Signed-
Rank test Mean Median Mean Median Mean t-test median 
Wilcoxon 
Signed-
Rank test 
 
Raw Return Excess Return 
Listing Day 0.131 0.163** 0.341** 0.135*** -0.210 -1.16 0.028 0.18 0.147 0.174** 0.343** 0.149*** -0.196 -1.07 0.025 0.37 
Day 2 0.147 0.125** 0.324** 0.113*** -0.177 -0.98 0.012 0.25 0.146 0.144** 0.326** 0.122*** -0.180 -0.99 0.022 0.22 
Day 5 0.202** 0.159 0.343** 0.132*** -0.141 -0.83 0.027 0.27 0.202** 0.136 0.340** 0.130*** -0.138 -0.81 0.006 0.34 
Day 10 0.256*** 0.187 0.345** 0.228*** -0.089 -0.56 -0.04 -0.08 0.254*** 0.196 0.345** 0.226*** -0.091 -0.57 -0.030 0.15 
Day 20 0.158 0.178*** 0.386*** 0.254** -0.228 -1.05 -0.08 -0.50 0.158 0.183*** 0.388*** 0.244** -0.230 -1.06 -0.061 0.44 
Panel B: Strategy B 
 
Low 
Oversubscription 
(38) 
High 
Oversubscription 
(37) Difference 
Low 
Oversubscription 
(38) 
High 
Oversubscription 
(37) Difference 
 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean t-test median 
Wilcoxon 
Signed-
Rank test Mean Median Mean Median Mean t-test median 
Wilcoxon 
Signed-
Rank test 
 
Raw Return Excess Return 
 
Listing Day -0.083 -0.172* -0.069** -0.092 -0.014 -0.16 -0.080 -0.02 -0.074 -0.156 -0.064** -0.068 -0.010 -0.11 -0.088 -0.08 
Day 2 -0.065 -0.123** -0.048* -0.100 -0.017 -0.17 -0.024 -0.19 -0.066 -0.120** -0.046* -0.077 -0.020 -0.19 -0.043 -0.31 
Day 5 -0.089 -0.146* -0.083* -0.157 -0.006 -0.06 0.011 0.01 -0.091 -0.156* -0.084* -0.115* -0.007 -0.07 -0.041 -0.10 
Day 10 -0.128 -0.208* -0.084* -0.177 -0.045 -0.43 -0.031 -0.09 -0.131 -0.202 -0.083* -0.156 -0.048 -0.46 -0.046 -0.11 
Day 20 -0.168* -0.253 -0.133** -0.187 -0.035 -0.36 -0.067 -0.66 -0.166* -0.258 -0.132** -0.206 -0.034 -0.35 -0.053 -0.68 
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Figure 1.  Mean Grey Market Premium and Underpricing of IPOs 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Mean Returns of Post-IPOs by Sentiments 
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Figure 3.  Mean Returns of Low and High GMP IPOs 
Return is computed based on )/()]([ GMPOPGMPOPPt  .  Where tP  is the closing price on 
the listing day, days 2, 5, 10, and 20. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Mean Cumulative Market Returns of Low and High GMP IPOs 
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